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American Nuclear Efforts: Prolonging the Cold War
Bryan McCracken
Bryan is a senior studying political science at Seton Hall University. A United States
Foreign Policy Course inspired his paper, sparking his interest in the field of nuclear
weapons, and the effect of their proliferation on the world. Post undergraduate, he plans
on attending law school, and is currently in the admissions process.

INTRODUCTION

I

n the relatively short history of nuclear
weapons, the word at first glance elicits various
associations such as fear, destruction and
death. Since their origin in the 1940’s, nuclear
weapons negotiations have relentlessly dominated
international relations to create a safer and more
stable world. The fact of the matter is that the
world is in a completely different nuclear
generation than it was when nuclear weapons were
created. The threat is no longer contained between
dominant world powers with seemingly endless
military, economic and technological ability. These
weapons have proliferated into a new existence, an
existence that appears to be far less certain, far
more dangerous and far more difficult to deter. In
the coming of this age, America has not been idle.
Years of diplomatic negotiations, generations of
treaties and billions upon billions of dollars have
been invested into nuclear non-proliferation
efforts, and weapons research has continued
throughout. This paper will evaluate whether these
efforts are worth it, and most importantly,
effective in keeping America and inevitably the
world safe.
The primary question this research will
analyze, is the following: Do American efforts of
strengthening their nuclear capabilities and
pursuing non-proliferation truly lead to a safer
country and world? This is an extremely important
topic; we are living in the nuclear age so this is
nothing less than a reality. There are rising
hostilities in the world, especially between new,
more radical nuclear threats. Assessing whether or
not U.S. security efforts are effective is critical. To
answer this question, this research will primarily

draw from two similar, but very different views in
literature regarding nuclear weapons. In The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate,
the two authors Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N.
Waltz present their different views on the
discussion regarding nuclear proliferation. This
book summarizes and combines independent
work on the matter by both authors and complies
it into a complete work. Although the later
chapters of the book contain dialogue in the form
of a debate, this research will focus on the first two
chapters, which simply present each authors
separate view of the matter. The work in this book
is similar in the sense that there is mutual
agreement regarding the ever present issue of the
reality and presence of nuclear weapons. However,
the views on how to address and think about this
issue is where the fundamental differences arise.
The counter perspectives will enable a contestable
discussion regarding the issue at hand.
This research will apply the ideas from the
literature to the nuclear history of America. The
question whether American deterrence efforts and
investments in nuclear technology are effective or
not will be addressed from both sides. In addition
to the primary arguments from Scott D. Sagan and
Kenneth N. Waltz, this paper will continue to
introduce literature that aligns with and or falls in
the middle of the views of the two primary articles.
The idea of this approach is to add to the
soundness of the arguments, as well as expand on
their ideas and even further strengthen the
different positions. After the literature review is
complete, it will be time to assess and relate the
findings to American history surrounding nuclear
weapons. The main idea here is that, in relating
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America’s efforts regarding nuclear weapons to the
literature, a firm consensus can be drawn, that is
not speculative since it is relying on two opposite
sides of research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

To begin the literature review, it is important to
first acquire an understanding of the two sides of
the matter. As stated before, this research will be
structured around the different views in the
enduring debate between Scott D. Sagan and
Kenneth N. Waltz.
Kenneth Waltz is a renowned name in the
field of political science. His work, and at times,
controversial views are loved and widely used in
the field of international relations education.
Waltz was born in 1924, and served in both World
War II and the Korean War (Mohn, 1). The
impact these two wars had on his life gave him
better insight and awareness to the importance of
international policy. After the two wars in which
he served, Waltz became critical of American
military intervention. This opinion persisted, as
Waltz became an “early critic of the American
efforts in Vietnam, and he was equally critical of
President George W. Bush's actions in Operation
Iraqi Freedom” (Mohn, 1). His 1981 dissertation,
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be
Better outlines his fundamental views on Military
intervention and deterrence, which the book The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate
heavily draws from.
Kenneth Waltz begins his argument by
essentially stating that despite the United States
non-proliferation efforts, the spread of nuclear
weapons is inevitable (Enduring Debate, 3). Waltz
bases his outlook of policy through the
international relations theory of realism. He claims
that in the international realm, the best way states
can help themselves is by providing for their own
security (Enduring Debate, 5). A state can prevent
another state from attacking and preserve their
own security through one of two ways. The first is
what Waltz calls the defensive ideal. The idea
behind this is that states must obtain a defense that
is so strong, that no other state will attempt an
attack. The other he calls deterrence theory, which
he points out, is commonly confused. Deterrence
is to prevent someone from doing something by

frightening them. He elaborates by saying,
“deterrence is achieved not through the ability to
defend but through the ability to punish”
(Enduring Debate, 5).
In the attempt to apply the theory of
deterrence and defense to the topic of nuclear
weapons, he points out his primary distinctive
point. Waltz states, “If nuclear weapons make the
offense more effective and the blackmailer’s threat
more compelling, then nuclear weapons are bad
for the world. On the other hand, if the defense
and deterrence are made easier and more reliable
by the spread of nuclear weapons, we may expect
the opposite result” (Enduring Debate, 6). Waltz’s
view is essentially that having nuclear weapons is
only good if it makes deterrence and defense
better, they are bad if they promote and enable
offensive tactics. This goes back to the theory of
realism. The level of a state’s power and
international stability correlates with their ability
to make themselves secure, which defense – not
offense – allows for. Waltz then goes on to explain
how nuclear weapons improve deterrence and
defense through a series of points.
He first points out that war can happen even if
deterrent threats are present. However, if a war
were to happen between two nuclear states, he
predicts it will deescalate in the fear of an
imminent escalation. Further, this fear of
imminent escalation will prevent states from
attempting small gains when there is a major risk
at hand. This is to say, states will take into greater
consideration the effects of conflict and the
potentially destructive price of victory. His second
point expands on his first. He poses the question,
“Why fight if you can’t win much and lose
everything?” (Enduring Debate, 7). He is saying
that a state will act with less care if the expected
costs of war are low and with greater care if they
are high.
He then draws on two examples from history
to strengthen his point. In the 1850’s France and
Britain entered into the Crimean War with Russia.
Victory was expected for France and Britain and
their actions portrayed their confidence, which in
war means carelessness. Although the outcome
was Britain and France’s victory, their known
prestigious power gave them the idea to show their
strength first and bargain second. However, in a
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sharp contrast, the Cold War showed opposite
considerations. The presence of similar weapons
put both the United States and the USSR on edge.
Kennedy and Khrushchev made rational decisions
with the consideration of their wellbeing, because
they weighed out the potential devastation of the
other’s response to their decisions. The third and
final point Waltz mentions is “Certainty about the
relative strength of adversaries also makes war less
likely” (Enduring Debate, 7). This garners a
completely different meaning in the age of the
nuclear weapons. In conventional warfare, which
has been present in the world for the majority of
history, one is uncertain about winning or losing
(Waltz, Enduring Debate, 9). However, a nuclear
world calls for a completely different type of
reasoning; a nuclear world presents humans with
an uncertain realization of either annihilation or
survival. Waltz remains consistent with the realist
mindset in shaping his three arguments. The sole
aim at survival will motivate any leader to consider
these points when deciding what to do militarily.
Further, it will deter them from taking nuclear
action because what will be lost may not be worth
what is gained.
To conclude and wrap up on Waltz’s idea of
“more may be better”, we must assess what these
points as a whole mean in terms of the reality the
world faces regarding nuclear weapons. In other
words, how can one apply what Waltz says about
nuclear defense and deterrence to what is actually
going on. In the beginning of his thesis, Waltz
presents an observation. He notices that “The
world has enjoyed more years of peace since 1945
than had been known in modern history, if peace
is defined as the absence of general war among the
major states of the world” (Waltz, “Enduring
Debate” 4). Waltz argues throughout his thesis
that nuclear proliferation is the cause of this
phenomenon. Based off his points listed above, he
leads to the idea that nuclear weapons pose a
completely new risk to the world, that even the
most radical of leaders take into greater
consideration its implications.
Waltz believes that this effect of mutual
deterrence is possible only if the spread of nuclear
weapons continues, especially to minor world
powers. Waltz explains that if three criteria are
met, the size and legitimacy of the state do not

matter; all that will matter is that they will be able
to deter. Waltz lists his criteria for being an
effective deterrent force as,
First, at least a part of a state’s nuclear forces must
appear to be able to survive an attack and launch
one of its own. Second, survival of forces must not
require early firing in response to what may be
false alarms. Third, command and control must be
reliably maintained; weapons must not be
susceptible to accidental or unauthorized use
(Enduring Debate, 20).
With these criteria met, smaller nuclear powers
can effectively deter larger nuclear powers because
they share in the ability to inflict “unacceptable
damage” (Waltz, “Enduring Debate” 21).
Essentially, the world will experience much less
frequent and intense wars, if more nuclear
weapons are present and further proliferated. The
common fear of escalation between nuclear
powers, the carefully considered outcomes, and
the overall uncertainty of what nuclear war
beholds, is enough to make war less likely and give
way to an obtainable peace among international
states.
The other side to this debate is presented by
Scott Sagan. Scott Sagan is a current professor of
politics at Stanford University. Throughout the
course of his life, Sagan has acquired numerous
honors and awards for his work in the field of
political science. Sagan’s primary academic
research includes the study of technology and war,
specifically, nuclear weapons. His section of the
debate in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An
Enduring Debate is drawn from his article The
Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory,
Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons.
Sagan begins his chapter titled “More Will Be
Worse,” by acknowledging the expansive literature
that advocates for nuclear proliferation, such as
the ideas presented by Waltz. However, Sagan
notes there is something substantial missing from
the debate. There is no, “Alternative theory of the
consequences of nuclear proliferation; an
alternative that is a broader conception of the
effects of nuclear weapons proliferation on the
likelihood of war” (Enduring Debate, 42). Sagan
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will confront this absent alternative through his
central argument that he calls “organization
theory” (Enduring Debate, 42). There are two
levels to this theory, the first being on the military
level and the second on the civil level. Sagan argues
that within professional military organizations,
there are common biases, inflexible routines, and
parochial interests, which lead to deterrence
failures and the possibility of deliberate and or,
accidental war (Enduring Debate, 42). The second
level revolves around the civil control of future
nuclear states. Sagan argues there is strong reason
to believe these future nuclear states, “will lack the
positive mechanisms of civilian control” (Enduring
Debate, 42). Sagan argues this because of the
common characteristics of current and emerging
nuclear states. In these states, they appear to have
either a military-run government or a weak
civilian-led government. In either of these two
cases, the military will have a strong presence on
policy. If the military has a strong influence, then
the first level of organizational theory, listed above,
will take place and deterrence failures are likely to
occur. More specifically, the structural and
organizational weaknesses of a state can cause
potentially extreme militant policies, which could
ruin the principles of deterrence theory.
To further support his argument, Sagan
compares his organizational deterrence theory
with Waltz’s rational deterrence theory. Sagan
recalls Waltz framework of deterrence and brings
to the surface the required assumption of this
entire theory, and that is the assumption of
rationality. The idea here is that costs are so high,
which renders sensitivity to military decisions
inevitable. In addition to noting the assumption of
rationality, Sagan lists requirements for stable
nuclear deterrence, which Waltz seems to
overlook. The first is that states cannot engage in a
preventive war while one state has nuclear
weapons and the other is in the process of
acquiring them. The second is that both states
must develop assured second-strike capabilities.
The third is that nuclear arsenals must not be
prone to accidental or unauthorized use. Sagan
points this out to show the reality of the situation.
States will pursue these requirements as goals,
because it is in their best security interest to do so.
However, by Sagan comparing his organizational

perspective, he will prove this as a problematic
belief.
Sagan begins to compare his organizational
theory by first pointing out that rational
deterrence rests simply upon assumptions.
Assumptions are nothing but just that, they are
not empirically tested or always accurate. They are
used because they are helpful in literature, almost
as an educated prediction into the future. Sagan
goes on to state, “The rational – actor view is
clearly not the only assumption that leads to useful
predictions about nuclear proliferation” (Enduring
Debate, 45). One potential, alternative assumption
could be the possibility that government leaders
intend to act in a rational order as Waltz’s theory
proposes, but perhaps that option is not available
to them and perhaps their final implementation of
orders are inescapably influenced from forces
within their country (Enduring Debate, 45). It can
however be argued that these decisions are still
rational, just negatively influenced by impractical
situations. However, there is no denying that there
is some level of imperfect and incomplete
rationality present in such conditions. This
criticism essentially leads to the larger point that
ideal conditions and perfect knowledge are elusive
and simply unrealistic. Sagan gives this contrasting
example to prove that one cannot just rest a case
on an assumption that nuclear weapons force a
state to be perfectly rational. It is in this counter
example of assumptions, that organizational
theory is able to present its true convincing case
against the theory of rational deterrence.
Sagan advances his argument by explaining
there are two themes central to organization
theory, which focus their attention on the major
impediments on assuming pure rationality of
behavior. The first is the observation that large
organizations function with a severely bounded or
limited, form of rationality (Enduring Debate, 46).
This is to say they inherently limit their
calculations and instead use simple mechanisms to
determine their decisions. Instead of fully
calculating reasoned decisions, large organizations
govern based off tendencies, patterns, rules, and
essentially “satisfice” (Enduring Debate, 46). Large
organizations tend to be “myopic”, (Enduring
Debate, 46) which is the same as saying narrowminded. When trying to decide on a decision, they
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fail to survey the entire environment for
information and instead look to often-biased
sources.
The second observation Sagan presents is that
large, complex organizations commonly have
multiple conflicting goals, and the process by
which objectives are chosen and pursued is
intensely political (Enduring Debate, 46). When a
decision is largely due to political factors, it is
inevitable that they serve interests of some of the
organization. The problems of this is that, the
favored interests are more often than not a narrow
interest of the group’s self-interested and
competitive members in power. Even then, one
cannot go forth and assume even that group of
self-interested individuals are rational. One would
expect this reason to be because it could be led by a
radical head figure. However, it in fact comes
down to the idea that conflict stems from
organizational deficiency, rather than the
characteristics of each individual. Sagan introduces
the example of the inner workings of a military
group. The soldiers have differing opinions than
the commanders, commanders have differing
opinions than that of command headquarters and
so on and so forth. This is to prove, even if a
professional military service acts in a relatively
rational way, these actions do not constitute the
military interests as a whole because of the chances
of present organizational deficiencies within.
“Because such narrow organizational interests
determine behavior, a theory of “rational” state
action is seriously weakened” (Enduring Debate,
47).
In terms of nuclear war, these themes of
organization entail some obvious potential
concerns. Sagan presents these fears by relating
them to the three operational requirements for
rational deterrence, which he claims Waltz
overlooked in the beginning of his section. If you
do not recall, Sagan lists these as –
1. States cannot engage in a preventive war
while one state has nuclear weapons and
the other is in the process of acquiring
them
2. States must develop assured second-strike
capabilities
3. Nuclear arsenals must not be prone to
accidental or unauthorized use.

The first operational requirement concerns the
period in which the world is changing from a
conventional to a nuclear one. The first nuclear
power must not attack (for preventive purposes)
any other state that is in the process of acquiring
nuclear capabilities. To strengthen his argument
Sagan addresses notions listed by Waltz in his
book The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May
Be Better. In this book, Waltz claims there are two
periods in a nuclear arms race that a state may
consider preventive strike. “First, a country may be
in an early stage of nuclear development and be
obviously unable to make nuclear weapons.
Second, a country may be in an advanced stage of
nuclear development and whether or not it has
some nuclear weapons may not be surely known”
(Waltz, More May be Better, 16).
Waltz further goes on to say that it would
seem more promising for a country to employ a
preventive strike in the first stated stage of nuclear
development, because they would assume that the
other state could not strike back. However, he
explains that even this is unlikely and unattractive.
If the strike is less than debilitating, one must be
prepared to occupy the country for the reasons of
monitoring and further preventing a nuclear
recovery period. This realization alone is enough
to prevent the strike from being implemented in
the first place. Sagan then comes back into the
discussion and undermines Waltz’s idea that a
state will not preemptively strike simply because it
is not in their end interest. He points out the flaw
in arbitrarily assuming “if there is even a remote
chance of nuclear retaliation, a rational decision
maker will not launch a preventive war” (Enduring
Debate, 49). Sagan’s organizational perspective is
far more pessimistic about this assumption
because it considers military intervention, which
Waltz dismisses because according to him,
everyone will have the same level of rationality in
considering nuclear war. Although there is some
truth in this, the main point of organizational
theory is that one cannot assume this truth to
stand in all circumstances. Military leaders are
more predisposed to view preventive war with
more favor because in short, they do not have to
worry about the broader political and diplomatic
issues involved in war. Military leaders are not
voted officials with political agendas to fill.
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Militaries are trained to focus on military goals
with victory at all costs mantras. They are war
ready soldiers not members of the Peace Corps. In
only considering the present, there is the crucial
long-term considerations absent. Further, since
civilians cannot accurately be assumed to be in
control of all future nuclear states, there is solid
ground to conclude that military biases in favor of
war will be at least – present enough to harm the
common rationality assumption that deterrence
theory requires.
The second operational requirement of
deterrence is the state’s capacity to withstand a
preventive nuclear strike, and still be able to
employ second-strike capabilities. This is to say,
every country that possesses nuclear weapons
must develop their forces to be invulnerable. Waltz
says this is possible for two reasons. The first is
summarized as “Not much is required to deter”
(Waltz, More May be Better, 19). What this means
in considering second – strike capabilities is, even
if a country is attacked, that same country will be
able to reciprocate enough destructive damage
with even one warhead. This builds on the next
reason that states, “Deterrent forces are seldom
delicate because no states wants delicate forces and
nuclear forces can easily be made sturdy” (Waltz,
More May be Better, 18). Therefore, in the event of
an attack, Waltz assumes that a state’s nuclear
forces will be well guarded and strategically placed
to prevent total loss of their second-strike
capability. To reiterate, Waltz concludes that states
will be aware of their nuclear capabilities, and will
rationally adjust their tactics to defend by
maintaining an offensive position if need be.
Sagan responds to this by questioning its
accuracy when applied to every given nuclear
situation. If only a few nuclear weapons
strategically placed is all that will suffice to deter,
then it is puzzling that arms races are seemingly
inevitable when it comes to nuclear weapons.
Waltz accredits this to “fuzzy thinking” on the
state level. Fuzzy thinking is more or less a
scapegoat created by Waltz to explain the apparent
arms races despite his point of not much being
needed to deter. However, Sagan replies by
introducing his organizational theory into the
matter and says “If fuzzy thinking at the domestic
level can cause a state to spend billions of dollars

building more forces than are necessary for
rational deterrence, couldn’t similar fuzzy thinking
at the organizational level also lead a state to build
inadequate forces?” (Enduring Debate, 58). As
stated previously, under an organizational theory,
militaries do not take nearly as much
consideration in their planning, which render
them irrational in some regards. Consequently,
even if Waltz’s parts are there, that is the proper
resources and conditions for second-strike
capabilities, a state may still not effectively reach
these capabilities if organizational biases dominate
the states behavior. In reality, it all comes down to
who is making the decisions. In Waltz’s model
there is no mention of militaries and in Sagan’s
model, the decision-making is generally controlled
by the imperfect militaries. In either case, Sagan is
not convinced that deterrence is always achievable.
The final operational requirement is that
nuclear arsenals must not be prone to accidental or
unauthorized use. Waltz looks to the history of
nuclear armament in the world and draws his
reasoning from that. Essentially, he arrives at the
fact that all countries have so far been able to
control their arms, despite tensions being so bitter
in their early history. He then raises the question
“why should we expect new nuclear states to
experience greater difficulties than the old ones
were able to cope with?” (More May be Better, 18).
Waltz rests this assumption on his theory of
rationality as stated, “we do not have to wonder
whether they will take good care of their weapons.
They have every incentive to do so. They will not
want to risk retaliation because one or more of
their warheads accidently strikes another country”
(More May be Better, 18). He reasons that it is
presumably in the best interest of a state to keep
their arms under strict control, in order to
preserve their own security. Take for example an
instance where a developing nuclear country loses
one of their nuclear weapons to a radical terrorist
organization within that country. If the stolen
weapon was launched from within the parameters
of that country, whatever country was hit will
retaliate on the state as a whole without looking to
see why the attack was employed in the first place.
Clearly no country wishes to receive a retaliation
strike, so why would they risk the susceptibility of
their nuclear weapons.
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In analyzing Sagan, Waltz’s reasoning behind
the likelihood of improper nuclear use seems to be
exactly what he was waiting for to complete his
organizational theory, more or less the piece that
solidifies his argument. What does organizational
theory say exactly about the likelihood of nuclear
weapon accidents? Well, the entire theory is
grounded on the possibility that instances like this
can occur in our non-perfect world, and that
rationality cannot so easily be assumed. If, as
Waltz states, organizations are rational, then they
may be able to achieve reliability in managing their
devastating technologies such as nuclear weapons.
However, if situations create an organization that
has limited rationality with present political
conflicts, then a pessimistic view to the operational
requirement would be much more appropriate.
Sagan takes it further than simply denying total
rationality. He introduces what is known as the
Normal Accidents theory by Charles Perrow. This
theory argues that there are limits to the degree of
which any organization can understand its
technological systems. In addition, “conflicting
objectives exist inside any organization: some top
– level authorities may place a high priority on
safety, while other on more self-interested
objectives” (Sagan, “Enduring Debate”, 68). This
ultimately leads to organizational failures through
risky behaviors, making it inevitable that system
accidents will occur. It is just a matter of time.
In conclusion, Sagan recognizes Waltz’s views
of stable deterrence based on rational assumptions
as valid, but he delves deeper into reality and says
rationality cannot always be assumed. Since
rationality cannot be assumed, it would be foolish
and potentially harmful to base policy off this
model, since the consequences could be so grave.
Organization theory by its nature “makes less
heroic assumptions about the rationality of states”
(Sagan, “Enduring Debate” 76). The epitome of
this theory is to err on the side of caution, keeping
in mind that there must be doubt in some
organizations to make the rational decision. This
goes beyond just saying Waltz’s theory is bad it
shows how it is susceptible to questioning because
of inevitable internal forces some organizations
will face. The primary takeaway of Sagan’s section
is stated perfectly by himself in the conclusion of
his chapter. He states, “Waltz has confused

prescriptions of what rational states should do,
with predictions of what real states will do”
(Enduring Debate” 78).
At this stage in the paper, the primary
frameworks for both sides have been presented
and analyzed. From here, it is time to introduce
other significant views from the field of nuclear
weapons study that fall within the division laid out
by Sagan and Waltz. The reason is that it will allow
sturdier ground for the American case analyzation
that will ensue. To keep the non-proliferation
momentum rolling, I will introduce first the
literature that in nature, aligns with Sagan and the
larger non-proliferation (less is more) idea. The
two pieces of literature chosen to support this view
are, the book About Glory and Terror: The
Growing Nuclear Danger by Steven Weinberg and
an academic article named The Myth of Nuclear
Deterrence by Ward Wilson. The two pieces of
literature are similar yet different. Each of the two
present different ways of supporting and
approaching their overall common consensus,
which is that nuclear deterrence and investments
in nuclear weaponry are not only ineffective, but
also harmful to a secure world.
Steven Weinberg, the author of About Glory
and Terror: The Growing Nuclear Danger is a
notable American Physicist, who was born in
1933. In the early years of his life, Weinberg was
not only deeply immersed in his love for science;
but he was also growing up in a heavily nuclear
influenced generation. Weinberg pursued his
passion for science and eventually attended
Princeton University, where he obtained his
doctoral degree in Physics. Weinberg went on to
achieve enormous prestige in the field of nuclear
physics when he unified the electromagnetic and
weak nuclear forces into the electroweak force
(Benson, 16). This complex theoretical
breakthrough led to him winning the Nobel Prize,
which further progressed his influence in the field.
Weinberg authored About Glory and Terror: The
Growing Nuclear Danger in 2004, as a political
theory that analyzes the effectiveness of attempts
to expand and modernize America’s already
massive nuclear arsenal.
The opening sentence in About Glory and
Terror: The Growing Nuclear Danger exposes an
important truth, “The United States possesses an
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enormous nuclear arsenal, left over from the days
of the Cold War” (Weinberg, 3). The reality of this
fact sheds light onto an important question, why
are all of these nuclear weapons still needed?
During the Cold War, the rational argument for
the large arsenal was motivated by deterrence
sentiments, much like the one presented by Waltz.
The idea was that “we had to be sure that the
soviets would be deterred from a surprise attack
on the United States by their certainty that enough
of our arsenal would survive any such attack to
allow us to deliver devastating response”
(Weinberg, 4). Now however, this “glorified”
arsenal is obsolete. It may seem as if the ability to
launch a preemptive strike against foreign nuclear
forces is in our benefit, but it is actually
enormously dangerous for all sides. If this is the
goal of both nuclear sides, their forces will be on
trigger alert. This tension presents the possibility
of a nuclear attack due to small miscalculations,
which will end in senseless devastation on both
sides. In short, the rational deterrence mindset is
not leading mankind into the peaceful waters away
from the terrifying Cold War era. Instead, it is
holding onto as much of that legacy as possible
(Weinberg, 6).
Much of the reason why countries try to
maintain their nuclear arsenals is because of the
fear of uncertainty. Weinberg addresses this in
asking, “Where is it written that the way to reduce
uncertainty is always to maximize our nuclear
capabilities?” (Weinberg, 25). It is crucial to keep
in mind the fact that what one nuclear power does,
another may imitate to keep the battlefield
“certain” so to say. Weinberg insists, “Dangers
may be increased rather than decreased” through
this strategy (Weinberg, 26). He relates this
finding to a military example, which took place in
Europe during the early 1900’s. In the early
twentieth century, Britain was the undisputed
greatest naval power of the world. In 1905, to
further this era of power, Admiral John Fisher
advocated for the construction of a new, deadlier
battleship. The design was completed, and was
given the name the Dreadnought. Dreadnoughts
fulfilled their goal and were superior to previous
naval ships; however, an unexpected result
occurred. Other countries saw this as an
opportunity to better their navy as well and soon

enough, they were able to construct their own
Dreadnoughts and thus, compete with Britain.
Suddenly, the size of a countries fleet no longer
mattered, just the number of Dreadnoughts a
country possessed (Weinberg, 27).
What was intended as a way to better Britain’s
navy, resulted in a naval arms race between Britain
and the other global superpower, Germany.
Britain was able to stay ahead, but forfeited great
expense and experienced many difficulties in the
process. Another admiral of the British navy
complained to parliament, “The whole British fleet
was morally scrapped and labeled obsolete at the
moment when it was at the zenith of its efficiency
and equal not to two but practically all the other
navies of the world combined” (Weinberg, 27).
This example is extremely relatable to the current
situation countries face regarding nuclear
weapons. Much like the case of Britain with the
creation of the Dreadnought, America is the now
the world’s leader in warfare and the creator of the
nuclear bomb. Comparatively, just like
Dreadnoughts, nuclear weapons are seen as a tool
for power, which are sought after to act as
equalizers. If anything has been deduced so far
from Weinberg, it is that such equalizers only
create more tension and are not serving national
security.
Weinberg concludes in recognizing that the
technology of nuclear weapons is extraordinary.
However, the piece currently missing is the
examination of which tasks they are effective in,
and which of these tasks needs to be pursued and
accomplished (Weinberg, 58). Without getting too
technical regarding the terms of nuclear
capabilities, Weinberg recognizes as an example
the “low-yield nuclear weapon” projects that are
being heavily funded. The error in these projects is
not necessarily the money being poured in; the
problem is, rather, that “it will encourage a new
round of nuclear weapons development
throughout the world” (Weinberg, 60). Similarly,
projects aimed toward missile defense is bound to
face the same negative results. One would think, a
system used to intentionally collide with an
enemies’ warhead is beneficial for the (oh shit)
moments. In reality, it poses the threat of keeping
tensions of the Cold War frozen in time because it
shows that we are actively preparing for
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something, anything. The main point and really
the principle that ties Weinberg’s analysis together
is that, seemingly harmless defensive strategies can
easily be mistaken for offensive strategies.
Therefore, there needs to be much more concern
in planning what is truly effective, after
considering how other countries will view and
respond to such actions.
The final piece of literature presented to
support the non-proliferation opinion comes from
Ward Wilson’s The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence.
According to his biography on the Federation of
American Scientists website, Wilson is “widely
acknowledged as the leading exponent of
pragmatic arguments against nuclear weapons in
the world today” (FAS.org). Wilson is an award
winning writer whose ideas and literature
challenges widely held fundamental assumptions
about nuclear weapons, primarily the theories
regarding rationality.
Wilson takes a rather interesting approach to
refute the held theory that nuclear weapons are
tools of deterrence. He notes that the common
ground proliferation proponents rest on is that the
belief of mutually assured destruction provides
unique stability in a crisis, which leads to
deterrence. However, Wilson believes there is
much to doubt in this theory, which he will prove
through his historical case analysis. Before he
delves into relating history with the current
nuclear state, Wilson lays out three practical
arguments against nuclear deterrence theories.
The first is that “city attacks” are not militarily
effective or likely to be decisive. The second is that
the psychology of terror that is supposed to work
in nuclear deterrence’s favor actually creates the
circumstances for unremitting resistance. The
third and final argument is, even though the field
is mostly conjectural, what little unambiguous
evidence does exist contradicts the claim that
nuclear deterrence works. (Wilson, 421). Each of
these arguments will be revisited and related to the
historical case studies Wilson decides to analyze.
Wilson first addresses the widely held core of
nuclear deterrence theory, which is the idea that
possible city bombings or any domestic attack will
deter nuclear powers from entering into conflict.
Deterrence theory holds that the idea of the loss of
land, life and inevitably the state will motivate

leaders to avoid any measure that could risk such
attacks. In other words, “there is the assumption
that leaders are influenced in decisions about war
and surrender by the deaths of noncombatants in
city based attacks” (Wilson, 423). The problem
with this notion and similarly with the other two
arguments is that there is insufficient historical
evidence to support these claims. Wilson then
looks to a relevant case from the Second World
War, when the impact of conventional aerial
bombings were being discussed. The conventional
bombs in this era were seen as horrifying tools,
capable of inflicting significant damage, similar to
how nuclear bombs are seen today. Italian general
Giulio Douhet understood the possible effects of
an air raid and stated, “A complete breakdown of
the social structure cannot but take place in a
country subjected to this kind of merciless
pounding.
The time would soon come, when to put an
end to the horror and suffering, the people would
rise and demand an end to war” (Wilson, 424).
However, history proved this and many other
similar predictions to be wrong. In the course of
World War II, England was subjected to serious
city bombings in London. Nevertheless, the
English never surrendered. In fact, it has been
noted that Churchill essentially forfeited London
as a diversion, which caused them to stay shy away
from Britain’s important military assets (Wilson,
425). In a separate but equivalent case, the
Germans also suffered air raids, even worse so
than did their neighbor England did. However,
German civilian morale remained strong as the
Nazi party prospered, and the economy actually
rose (Wilson, 425).
The difficult case of city bombing to work with
is inevitably Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Wilson
posits the possible reason this case is hard to
analyze, is because “people are unable to resist
confusing arguments about whether nuclear
weapons were effective with arguments about
whether their use was morally justified” (Waltz,
426). Wilson himself admits this is a difficult case
to analyze because there really has never been
anything quite like it. However, in recent
scholarship, there have been reasons presented
that serve as arguments against the belief that
bombs were the reason for Japanese surrender.
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Some of these arguments include, the Soviet
invasion on August 5 altered Japan’s strategic
situation and was more of the reason for surrender
than the bombs were. This is supported by another
argument, which essentially purports that the
bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima were just a
continuation of city bombings that were generally
equal to the culmination of the destruction of the
conventional attacks (Wilson, 426). If they did not
surrender before when their country was being
annihilated by conventional bombs, why would
they surrender after the nuclear bombs were
dropped if the damage was similar? This leads
back to the possibility that the Soviet Invasion was
the true reason for surrender, not the nuclear
bombs.
The second argument against deterrence
regards the psychology of terror. Wilson
approaches terrorism by comparing its central
mechanisms to the core nature of deterrence.
Ultimately, Wilson concludes that terrorism is
ineffective at working in deterrence’s favor and in
doing so, he further concludes that deterrence, as a
concept is ineffective. Wilson states that,
“terrorism is supposed to work by killing civilians
in order to shock and horrify governments into
complying with a terrorist’s demands” (Wilson,
430). In a less extreme level, deterrence essentially
aims at the same thing. Earlier in this paper, Waltz
defines deterrence as preventing someone from
doing something by frightening them. The
ineffective part of both terrorism and deterrence is
in the common factor of achieving ones policy
through the implementation of fear or threats. In
past events, efforts of terrorism have not ended
with the country being attacked simply
succumbing out of fear. For example, look to the
tragic events of 9/11. People were indeed
frightened, but more than anything furious and
ready to retaliate on the aggressors.
The primary reason behind this is that, no
matter the magnitude of the attack, the livelihood
of the entire country is threatened. Wilson
explains this phenomenon in saying, “If you attack
civilians, in other words, no matter what sort of
message you intend to communicate, you already
are likely to simply convince your opponent that
you intend to exterminate him and the country as
a whole” (Wilson, 431). This concept can mutually

be applied to the deterrence model because any
perceived act of threat or aggression will have
adverse consequences for the side who posed the
threat in the first place. When the primary strategy
of achieving ones policy is through fear, it will
more likely than not end in conflict because of the
active and heightened defense that is forced upon
the threatened state. In other words, if two states
are in a conflict and both of their strategies are
deterrence, both countries will ideally be ready to
attack at a moment’s notice because they are each
assuming the other has the same mindset. This is
why the Cuban missile crisis was so frightening.
Any perceived act of aggression between the
United States and the Soviet Union could have
released thousands of nuclear weapons ending
millions of lives indefinitely. Terrorist threats
essentially act in the same way. The more threats
and violence a terrorist organization inflicts, the
more likely a state will be inclined to retaliate at all
costs.
The last argument presented by Wilson is that
the evidence that does exist for the pro deterrence
model is contradictive and seemingly ignorant of
history. The first example that Wilson looks to is
the arbitrary assumption that deterrence prevented
nuclear attacks during the frigid Cold War years of
1950 – 1980. The fact of the matter is there are
countless other explanations for such absence of
nuclear attacks. Comparatively, the hundred years
following the Napoleonic wars were for the most
part peaceful, but we have no problem attributing
these to, “war weariness, economic exhaustion, or
domestic political distraction” (Wilson, 433). Is it
too implausible to assume that the United States
and the USSR were equally “war tired”? In essence,
how can we accurately conclude that deterrence
prevented war without clear evidence that war was
even imminent between the two countries
(Wilson, 433)?
Ultimately, Wilson is arguing the things that
are so popularly attributed to deterrence lose most
of their ground when you introduce reality and
historically similar events into the equation. Much
of what deterrence and the larger pro-proliferation
argument relies on is that states will be rational
because they will do whatever it takes to preserve
their infrastructure and cities. After analyzing
history, this central assumption is seriously
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weakened because of the many examples of cities
being close to annihilated, yet remained
undefeated. Equally, in the terrorism/deterrence
comparison, there is the consensus that these
practices are effective ways of achieving policy
goals. However, after history is introduced, this
theory too loses validation. Lastly, commonly held
assumptions that deterrence is the reason for the
peace in the Cold War are contradicted with a
similar scenario of peace following other major
conflicts, but for different reasons that the blindly
assumed deterrence theory.
Thus far, there has been a sufficient amount of
literature that supports the less is more view of
Sagan. It is now time to move on to the other side
of the enduring debate, and present some of the
literature that supports Waltz’s more is better
view. The two authors chosen to advocate for this
view are Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H.
Riker, who jointly contribute to the academic
thesis An Assessment of the Merits of Selective
Nuclear Proliferation. Both de Mesquita and Riker
are well known political scientists, with a special
influence on the scientist part. The primary
grounds they base their political theories on is
calculative equations such as game theory. In
analyzing their work however, I will stay clear of
the complex mathematical equations but explain
the takeaways of each of their findings in simple
form.
The title alone, An Assessment of the Merits of
Selective Nuclear Proliferation, explicitly tells us
something about the conclusion of this literature.
The selective aspect means there will be some
weighing out of both sides in their findings, which
seems typical of mathematically motivated minds.
Nevertheless, this research advocates for nuclear
proliferation, or the spread of nuclear weapons
throughout the world. Riker and de Mesquita
begin their argument through presenting the
observation that the United States has relied on
two policies to defend themselves since the onset
of nuclear reality. These include, “The
maintenance of a stock of weapons and delivery
systems that at least allows for retaliation against
any potential nuclear attack and the
discouragement of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons among countries hitherto not so armed”
(de Mesquita, Riker, 283). Together, these defense

policies constitute deterrence. The rationale for
this policy is the same as had been discussed
previously; no one will attempt to attack the
United States even if they themselves had
weapons, because they risk the fear of retaliation.
If we were to judge its effectiveness simply by
looking at nuclear conflicts since these policies
were implemented, the policy would obviously be
said to work, since that number is zero. However,
the two scientists do not rest their case there. They
want to base their preferred policy of deterrence
on something more substantial, “But to the degree
that the policy has not been critically analyzed and
its consequences clearly understood, we do not
know what the putative success has cost and
whether it is due to good planning or good luck”
(de Mesquita, Riker, 284). The two scientists go
about strengthening the grounds of deterrence by
presenting a model of conflict decision making.
Today, conflict situations render down to four
scenarios, they are,
“(A) The initiator and the initiators opponent both
have nuclear capability sufficient to impose
unacceptable damage on the other. (B) The
initiator has a nuclear capability as described in
(A), but the opponent has only conventional (or
modest nuclear) capabilities insufficient to impose
unacceptable damage. (C) The initiator has only a
conventional capability and the opponent has a
nuclear retaliatory capability as in (A). (D) Both
the initiator and the opponent have only a
conventional (or modest nuclear) capability
insufficient to impose unacceptable damage.” (de
Mesquita, Riker 293).
From this list of strategies, the authors construct a
prisoner’s dilemma game board titled, “To
Proliferate or Not”
Nonnuclear
Nuclear
Nonnuclear D,D
C,B
Nuclear
B,C
A,A
As we can see from this figure, when the
nuclear capabilities of the adversaries are
symmetrical, then “neither is clearly able to
impose its will upon the other, nor does either
have any incentive to use its nuclear capability in a
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war against the other” (de Mesquita, Riker, 300). It
is now that we can rely on historical evidence to
back up this equation. As shown above, when
there is a conflict between a nuclear power and a
non-nuclear power, one could assume that the
outcome would be nuclear, just as in the conflict
between Japan and the United States. However,
when two nations that are nuclear powers enter in
a conflict, the assumption is that the losses will be
so devastating, that the conflict will deescalate and
avoid nuclear war at all costs. This can most
infamously be related to the Cold War.
The reality the world faces today is that nukes
are out there, and have already proliferated
whether we like it or not. However, de Mesquita
and Riker are not advocating that countries with
nukes dump their nuclear repertoire into any
country that does not possess them. Instead, they
take a practical approach for advocating
proliferation. The authors recognize the reality of
what they refer to as “non-territorial terrorist
organizations” (de Mesquita, Riker, 304). The
existence of these groups harm their game theory
analysis because these organizations essentially
have nothing to lose. Therefore, deterrence will
not be as effective on them and likewise, they will
not consider their destruction since they offer no
obvious retaliation targets. Due to this, the authors
advocate to weigh out the possibilities to the point
where proliferation is expected to decrease
violence more so than proliferation would increase
violence at the hands of the terrorists. In
conclusion, blind proliferation may not be the
answer that best serves national security. However,
the authors are saying their analysis is concise and
that when done properly, proliferation will act as a
deterrent against nuclear war.

ANALYSIS

Based off the literature review, one can infer that
the landscape of opinions regarding nuclear policy
is vast. The literature that has been presented in
this paper displays division in support for either
the non-proliferation or pro-proliferation theory.
However, what is clear in both arguments is that
we are living in a nuclear reality. Metaphorically,
the genie has been permanently let out of the
bottle and what has been done cannot be reversed.
Nevertheless, the question at hand is how America

is supposed to deal with this almost science
fictional reality of a potential Armageddon. More
importantly, are the efforts already taken
effectively serving our, and inevitably, the world’s
best security interest? Yet, before this research can
move on to an argument for or against the
effectiveness of American nuclear efforts, the
crucial element regarding the history of American
nuclear weapons and treaties must first be added
into consideration. By briefly relating the major
historical elements with the differing theories from
the literature, we can determine its effectiveness,
and ultimately arrive at a conclusion.
America’s nuclear history is unique; the reason
for this is rather obvious. To this day, America is
the only country to have used a nuclear bomb in
warfare with the attack on Nagasaki and
Hiroshima in August of 1945. However, it would
be inaccurate to say that this initiated the nuclear
age. Rather, the nuclear age commenced on a cold
December morning in 1942, when Arthur
Compton received a ground breaking cryptic,
coded statement reading “The Italian navigator
has just landed in the new world” (Clarfield,
Wiecek, 1). Arthur Compton was a Nobel laureate
and director of the University of Chicago’s
Metallurgical Laboratory, and the “Italian
navigator” was an Italian scientist named Enrico
Fermi who had just successfully demonstrated
controlled atomic fission (Clarfield, Wiecek, 1).
This was more than a scientific breakthrough; it
was a crucial piece to a puzzle in the feverish secret
race to produce nuclear weapons.
This feverish race originated a few years earlier
with the United States realization of the imminent
Nazi war machine. In 1939, “Albert Einstein and
Leo Szilard warned of developments in Nazi
Germany and urged President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to begin a research program on nuclear
fission for military use” (Sidel, Levy, 1). Roosevelt
took heed to this suggestion and created the
Manhattan Project in 1941 to develop, produce
and test the bombs. The Manhattan project was a
highly classified mission lead by nuclear physicist
Robert Oppenheimer. Despite its name, the work
of the project was distributed to various locations
all over the country, which employed some of the
brightest scientific minds like that of Compton
and Fermi. Just a year after Roosevelt started the
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project, the Italian navigator successfully reached
atomic fission. A few short years later, on the
morning of July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New
Mexico, the world’s first nuclear weapon
detonation test called the Trinity Explosion was
completed (Schenck, Youmans, 400). This was it, it
validated the design and functionality of the bomb
and it is exactly what the Manhattan Project was
intended to do. The bomb was eventually put to
use, and was detonated over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. The combined causality rate staggered
near 150,000 people and the true power of the
bomb was revealed to the world. The primary
question at hand moved from, how the bomb is
going to be completed, to – what next?
America and the international community
sought to answer this question in 1946 when “they
began negotiations under the auspices of the
United Nations, on the international control of
atomic energy” (Perry, 36). The proposal was a
U.S. sponsored plan known as the Baruch Plan.
The primary goal of this plan was that all nuclear
activities be controlled by an international entity
under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council.
Any state that broke such agreements would be
duly punished. In addition, the Soviet Union
would have to agree to inspection before the
United States even thought about giving up their
nuclear weapons (Perry, 36-37). It was no surprise
that the stringent agreements of this proposal were
ill received by the Soviet Union, “Stalin’s young
delegate to the UN Atomic Energy Commission
rejected the U.S. plan” (Clarfield, Wiecek, 1). The
reason for this rejection was speculated that the
Soviet Union was determined to match the United
States by developing their own bomb (Perry, 3637). This of course was proven accurate in 1949
when the Soviet Union successfully detonated
their first nuclear weapon.
The Soviet Union’s success in detonating a
nuclear bomb caused the once singular nuclear
power America, to become uneasy. The fact of the
matter was that America just lost their nuclear
monopoly. Despite the obvious differences
between testing and successfully employing a
nuclear weapon, the United States and then
president, Harry Truman recognized the need to
act. Truman’s response to this was to develop a
more advanced and therefore, deadlier nuclear

weapon known as the hydrogen bomb. The
primary rationale behind this decision was fully
based on the Soviets past nuclear success, so if
Truman did not pursue it, then the Soviets would
beat them to it (Charnysh, 2). However, “the
Russians followed in this pursuit” (Rotblat et al,
22), which launched the nuclear arms race into
immediate effect (pun – intended).
In the 1950’s, Truman’s successor, Dwight D.
Eisenhower attempted at a more passive and
diplomatic approach. He announced his idea to
the United Nations under the umbrella term, the
Atoms for Peace program. After a frightening
speculation of the destructive power of the world’s
nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower suggested that, “this
greatest of destructive forces can be developed into
a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind”
(Clarfield, Wiecek, 184). Eisenhower proposed
that the major nuclear powers (United States,
Soviet Union and Great Britain) “contribute
uranium and other fissionable materials to a
stockpile administered by a proposed
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)”
(Clarfield, Wiecek, 184). From here, the IAEA will
distribute this material to promote peaceful
purposes. The program achieved this for “twentysix developing and friendly nations. In return, the
recipient nations fulfilled U.S.-required
safeguards, such as having inspectors continually
monitor the transferred technology to ensure its
peaceful use” (Schenck, Youmans, 405).
Despite all the beneficial purposes Atoms for
Peace produced, these negotiations did not result
in any formal international arms control
agreements. The Cold War only got colder and
nuclear weapons tests only got larger and more
frequent. In October of 1962, U.S. President
Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev found
themselves face to face in the Cuban missile crisis,
which has been referred to as the most dangerous
crisis of the Cold War. (Perry, 41). The intensity
and frequency of such events caused public anxiety
to grow, which compelled governments to seek
“partial measures to alleviate immediate worries”
(Rotblat et al, 24). The treaties that originated
from these alleviation efforts still had the end goal
of complete nuclear disarmament, however, they
shifted their goals from the generalized
commitment to disarmament, to the more focused
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approach of deterrence (preventing the use of
nuclear weapons) (Schenck, Youmans, 406).
Essentially, the major nuclear powers realized
disarmament was practically impossible if that is
your primary goal. The hope was that by shifting
goals to deterrence, maybe someday disarmament
might be reachable. The treaties that contain the
shift in policy include, the Partial Test Ban Treaty
of 1963, which limited nuclear testing by
prohibiting the testing in the atmosphere, outer
space and underwater. The Tlatelolco Treaty of
1967, which essentially established disarmament in
at least part of the world by creating nuclear free
zones. Latin American countries played the largest
role in this treaty, as they signed away their rights
of ever acquiring nuclear weapons. However, the
main treaty that came from this is the NonProliferation Treaty of 1968 (Rotblat, 24-25).
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was the
principal treaty because it “represented the first
major effort by the international community of
nations to limit the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction” (Schenck, Youmans, 408). The
core of the NPT prohibits member nations that do
not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them. In
addition, the NPT allows inspections by the IAEA
to ensure that nuclear enriched elements such as
plutonium and uranium are being used for nuclear
energy and not nuclear weapons. Essentially this
part of the treaty strengthens the Atoms for Peace
doctrine of the Eisenhower era (Rotblat, 24-25).
For the states that possessed nuclear weapons,
“they agreed not to transfer these weapons to nonnuclear states, while at the same time working
towards the goal of eventual nuclear disarmament”
(Schenck, Youmans, 408). Despite all of these U.S.
sponsored demands, there are no provisions that
prohibit deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons.
There was obvious Soviet discontent, but the final
draft did not prohibit the United States from
deploying weapons in allied countries (Perry, 77).
In the sixty years following the NPT of 1968,
the United States began to hone in on their goals
regarding nuclear policy. Instead of advocating for
non-proliferation at large, the United States
focused their attention on their dominant threats.
Until the end of the Cold War in the 1980’s, the
obvious threat that dominated their policy
decisions was the Soviet Union. The arms race

between the United States and the Soviet Union
produced nuclear arsenals ranging in the tens of
thousands second-strike capable nukes. It was a
seemingly endless construction. The everexpanding repertories of both sides compelled
them to keep trying to beat out their opponent by
out-building them. The acronym MAD, which
stands for mutually assured destruction, was
accredited to the extremely dangerous situation
that the arms race created. In order to prevent this
potential assured destruction; in 1968, President
Lyndon B. Johnson suggested a series of talks with
the Soviet Union called the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT). These talks began in
1970 between his successor Richard Nixon and
Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The
first of these talks known as SALT I resulted in two
rather important agreements, “The Interim
Agreement on Offensive Arms, which limited the
offensive strategic weaponry such as submarines.
And the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM),
which limited ICBM defense missiles” (Schenck,
Youmans, 416).
In the next seven years, discussions aimed at
improving the SALT I treaties opened up the doors
for SALT II. However, these did not come as easily
as SALT I. Overall, these discussions took seven
years and fell into Jimmy Carters term. The two
countries came to the agreement that since the
SALT I agreements, their weapon designs shifted,
thus rendering future agreements difficult because
of their incompatible technologies. For better or
worse, anything that was agreed on was suspended
because of the 1980 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. After this conflict ended the two
countries resumed discussions, this time called the
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). These
discussions were infamously between U.S.
President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev. Reagan laid out the primary
goal, which was designed “to limit the actual
weapons, the warheads, ‘which are what kill
people,’ as distinguished from the approach of the
Nixon, Ford, Carter administrations, which only
limited the delivery vehicle and bombers”
(Schenck, Youmans, 425).
At first, these were not well received by
President Gorbachev but eventually the two met.
They concluded that nuclear war must never be
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fought and their nuclear arms must be reduced. By
the end of the meetings the United States and the
Soviet Union agreed on reducing “strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles to 1,600 and cap deployed nuclear
warheads at 6,000” (Schenck, Youmans, 426). In
addition, “the two reached the so called “doublezero” option, which called for the complete
elimination of all intermediate-range and shorterrange nuclear forces (INF)” (Schenck, Youmans,
427). This was an immense treaty because in
addition to eliminating INF missiles, it also
implemented on-site inspections, which broke
enormous barriers between the long tensed United
States and the Soviet Union.
START agreements are still currently active
and in the nuclear policy between the United
States and Russia, because the size of both nuclear
stockpiles are still nothing to disregard. However,
American- Russian nuclear conflict is no longer at
the top priority for America. At the end of the
1980’s and into the early 1990’s the long standing
Soviet Union took its lasts breaths and eventually
dissolved into the Russian Federation. The United
States nuclear policy shifted into more or less the
primary focus of the current policy. Now, the
United States main threats involve those
commonly called radical and rogue nations, who
are constantly working towards getting nuclear
weapons. This focus especially heightened in the
years following September 11, 2001, because this
threat simply became too legitimate to possibly
ignore.
The new policy is widely referred to as
“preemption,” which calls for America to act
against these dangerous acquisitions of Weapons
of Mass Destruction before they fully form (Perry,
300). Deterrence would not necessarily work
under this situation because “deterrence is based
only on the threat of retaliation and thus less likely
to work against rogue states who are more willing
to take risks” (Perry, 300). Essentially, terrorism is
an ideology not an entity like a state, so it
undermines the fundamental principles of
deterrence because it takes out the retaliation
factor. Because of the reality regarding the
difficulties involved with addressing nuclear
terrorism, the United States continues to support
the NPT because of the potential horrors
proliferation into the wrong hands can cause. The

hope is that any illicit and potentially nefarious
nuclear activity can be prematurely executed. This
theory of preemption and non-proliferation is
perfectly portrayed in the recent U.S. – Iranian
nuclear deal. In short, the United States goal
throughout this is to prevent any ability or
potential possibility of the Iranian government, or
radical groups refuging in Iran, from constructing
a bomb.
However, where the policy of preemption will
take us is uncertain. We are dealing with radical
groups and nations that are commonly shielded by
the sovereignty of the state in which they reside.
Consequently, the United States will face assured
limitations on the amount of preemptive tasks that
can be accomplished. Take as an example the
present threat of North Korea, where nuclear
weapons have entered into the possession of a
radical leader. Deterrence may work in this
scenario, but that is only if we assume rationality
amongst the leaders. That is, both the United
States and especially North Korea refrain from
nuclear attacks because they fear the same
mutually assured destruction. Nevertheless, the
United States essentially is barred from pursuing
any act of preemption that violates North Koreas
Sovereignty. Another factor that has come into
play with the North Korean equation highlights a
potential flaw facing the nonproliferation and
preemption policies as a whole.
Since North Koreas joining of the NPT in
1985, they have successfully hid some of their
nuclear activities from IAEA inspectors (Perry,
303). North Korean scientists then learned how to
separate the plutonium from the other elements of
the hidden materials, which supposedly were for
“peaceful purposes.” These events are perfect
examples of Latent Proliferation, which is the
covert spread of nuclear weapons. “North Korea’s
development of nuclear technology, while
ostensibly for peaceful purposes, gave it a latent
capability to make plutonium for nuclear
weapons” (Perry, 303). From this, the United
States can further deduce that due to structural, or
dare I say “organizational” weaknesses, our policy
of preemption and nonproliferation may not
totally suffice in the global struggle to address
nuclear weapons in a way that makes the world
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safer. However, where does all of this leave the
United States?
Based on the chronological historical evidence
and the theoretical division presented in the
literature, we can respond to the research question:
Does American efforts of strengthening their
nuclear capabilities and pursuing nonproliferation truly lead to a safer country and
world? Since the beginning of the nuclear era,
America has implemented policies with parts of
both Sagan and Waltz’s theories. American
policies are aimed towards deterrence and nonproliferation, but with the enduring necessity to
remain the leading nuclear power. This effectively
began right after America dropped the first bomb.
As the dust was clearing, America knew it had to
preserve this dominating force and looked to do so
through their proposed Baruch Plan that called for
the international control of nuclear activity. What
America feared the most, became a reality when
the Soviet Union successfully detonated their
bomb. This tragedy of losing the American nuclear
monopoly consumed the mindset of American
leaders, which in turn motivated them to pursue
new options of regaining that once held untouched
and formidable power in the world.
Instead of nipping the new nuclear
technologies in the bud, America reacted with the
decision to construct the ever more powerful
hydrogen bomb. The Soviet Union was also
looking to be regarded as the dominant power, so
they followed in these pursuits, which resulted in
the Arms Race. What was once a potentially
manageable problem quickly evolved into frantic
nuclear producing tensions. The American power
seeking policies further continued, although
sometimes in not so obvious ways. The nonproliferation and deterrence efforts were obscured
as treaties such as the Partial Test Ban, Tlateloco,
NPT, SALT and START treaties. Each of these
treaties had different specific objectives but all had
the same underlying primary goal. They all
intended in some way to restrict the access of
nuclear weapons to weak and powerful nuclear
states alike. Through this, America would have the
upper hand as intended. Even in the tougher
America – Soviet Union treaties that seemed
equal, America was still on top because their

nuclear capability prevailed despite the diminished
size the treaties called for.
Despite all of America’s intentions that
actually do give them the upper hand, the World is
still in a nuclear tense position. This is because the
adverse effects of America’s policies are in reality
occurring. Although the technology and
administrations have changed, the consistent
policies geared towards giving America the upper
hand is only keeping tensions very much alive. To
support this observation, we have to look at
literature whose theories advocate for such. In
Steven Weinberg’s opinion, the various dominant
pursuing policies of America may easily be
mistaken for offensive strategies. This means
America’s neorealist policy of security through
defense and deterrence advocated by Waltz, is
actually keeping the tensions alive. This is because
we are posing almost subliminal threats to the rest
of the world through our policy of fear. This is
much like the terrorist model presented by
Wilson, who says these policies are much more
likely to end in conflict because of the heightened
defense that America forces on other countries,
which they think they are successfully deterring. If
there was to be a fight between a strong man and a
weak man and the fight was determined by
strength, the strong man would win. In an attempt
to better his outcome, the strong man being who
he is, will motivate the weak man to pack on
serious muscle until the sides are even. This is
exactly what is happening through Americas
polices. Instead of negotiating, both sides are
looking to get bigger and stronger which would
ultimately make the fight bloodier and more
violent.
To strengthen this analysis, let us identify two
significant paradoxes on the matter. The first is the
fact that nuclear weapons are like any other
weapon in the sense that they are meant to be
used. However, they can never be used again
because if they are the world will see definite
irreversible destruction. The issue in resolving this
discrepancy is that the countries of the world are
simply not acting as if this is the case. The theory
of deterrence is blinding leaders of this reality
because of the goal to constantly match one
another. The effect of this is more nuclear weapons
that simply widen this paradox. In order to
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mitigate and hopefully diminish such a
discrepancy, the only realistic policy would be to
reduce the amount of weapons to the point where
this is no longer the case. The second paradox
present is that governance is most needed in this
area of international nuclear weapons agreements,
but ultimately there is no basis for binding
international rules. The treaties on nuclear
weapons for the most part have been effective, but
in reality these agreements are nothing more than
mere suggestions. The fact of the matter is when it
comes down to such an immense and rather
uncharted reality of nuclear weapons, states will
ultimately choose to act in a way that is aligned
with survival in mind. The problem here is
essentially figuring out which is the best way to
survive, and the deeper problem is that countries
are settling with scare tactics to keep themselves
safe.
Although the world has seen seventy plus
years of no nuclear catastrophes, arms races and
tensions remained ever so high. Throughout this
research, there has been conclusive evidence to
suggest that America is in part the reason behind
such nuclear hostilities that have been present. Just
because there has not been nuclear attacks, does
not mean American policies are keeping the
country and the world safe. There needs to be
much more concern in planning what is truly
effective, after carefully considering how other
countries will view and respond to such actions.
The non-proliferation policies have grounds to
them but America must remove the toxic
deterrence model from the equation. If this is not
implemented, irrational and rogue leaders will
continue to look for ways to even the field and not
find any reason to discontinue their attempts at
gaining nuclear capabilities. Thus, our current
situation could worsen and conceivably lead to
world disaster. What has happened has happened
and we cannot undo the past. However, we must

realize that we are indeed living in a nuclear world
and because of this; we cannot keep devising
treaties and developing weapons with the aim at
deterring other nations from using theirs. We
must put it behind us and transition our efforts
towards diplomacy if we ever want to see tensions
deescalate and the world became a safer place.
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